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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

SHENKER v. LAUREATE EDUCATION, INC.: WHERE
CORPORATE DIRECTORS EXERCISE NON-MANAGERIAL
FIDUCIARY DUTIES BEYOND THOSE ENUMERATED IN
SECTION 2-405.1(a) OF THE CORPORATIONS AND
ASSOCIA TIONS ARTICLE, THEY REMAIN LIABLE
DIRECTLY TO SHAREHOLDERS FOR ANY BREACH OF
THOSE FIDUCIARY DUTIES.

By: David Feliciano

T

he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, when corporate
directors exercise duties that are non-managerial and outside the
scope of section 2-405.l(a) of the Corporations and Associations
Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, they remain liable to
shareholders for any breach of their fiduciary duties. Shenker v.
Laureate Educ., Inc., 411 Md. 317, 983 A.2d 408 (2009) (citing MD.
CODE ANN., CORPs. & Ass'NS § 2-405.1 (a)). Therefore, when
directors of Maryland corporations exercise the non-managerial duty
of negotiating the value that shareholders will receive in a cash-out
merger transaction, they owe to the shareholders the fiduciary
common law duties of candor and maximization of shareholder value.
Id. at 336,983 A.2d at 419.
In June 2006, Chairman and CEO of Laureate Education, Inc.
("Laureate"), Douglas Becker ("Becker"), proposed the idea of a cashout merger to Laureate's Board of Directors ("the Board"). On
September 8, 2006, Becker informed the Board that he, along with
several investors, intended to make an offer to purchase Laureate. The
Board immediately created a special committee of disinterested
directors to assess proposed offers. After Becker withdrew his first
offer, the special committee unanimously recommended that the Board
accept Becker's second offer. Becker's second offer price provided an
11.1 % premium over Laureate's most recent stock trading price. On
June 3,2007, Laureate further announced that it had accepted a "shortform" merger where Becker and the other respondent investors could
purchase up to one share above 90% of the total shares outstanding.
Petitioner shareholders alleged that the Board: (1) failed to carry out a
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suitable market check of Laureate's stock value; (2) issued a
materially deceiving summary form of the tender offer; and (3) created
an evaluation process that was riddled with conflict.
The shareholders filed a direct lawsuit, rather than a derivative
complaint, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging that the
Board breached its fiduciary duties to the petitioners as shareholders,
conspired to breach those duties, and aided and abetted that breach.
The circuit court granted the Board's Motion to Dismiss, citing section
2-405.1 (g) of the Corporations and Associations Article, which states
that shareholders may not directly sue corporate directors for alleged
violations of fiduciary duties. The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed, holding that corporations do not owe a common
law fiduciary duty directly to shareholders, and any shareholder claims
must be raised in a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation.
Shenker petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which granted
certiorari.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by addressing
the legal sources of a corporate director's duties. Shenker, 411 Md. at
335-36, 983 A.2d at 418-19. The Board contended that section 2405.1(a) is the only source of directorial duties. Id. at 339, 983 A.2d
at 421. Specifically, section 2-405.1(a) states that directors must
perform their managerial acts in good faith, reasonably in the best
interest of the corporation, and with the care of an ordinarily prudent
person under similar circumstances. Id. at 336, 983 A.2d at 419
(citing MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-405.1(a)). The court,
however, found that, beyond the duties of section 2-405 .1 (a), are the
additional common law duties of candor and maximization of
shareholder value. Id. at 337-38, 983 A.2d at 419-20. These two
common law duties arise when a corporate director is negotiating the
monetary amount that shareholders will receive in a cash-out merger
transaction. Id.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged that section 2405.1(a) governs a director's duty of care when making managerial
decisions for the corporation itself. Id. at 338, 983 A.2d at 420. The
court, however, identified that section 2-405.I(a) lacks guidance
regarding a director's duty of care in non-managerial decisions.
Shenker, 411 Md. at 338-39, 983 A.2d at 420. The court adopted its
reasoning from Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
a landmark Delaware case. !d. at 338-39, 983 A.2d at 420-21 (citing
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986)). The court stated that, after making the threshold
decision to sell the company, the director's role changes from that of
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the manager of business affairs for the corporation to the negotiator of
the highest possible price for the stockholders. Id. at 338-39,983 A.2d
at 420-21 (citing Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182). It is this new role that
instills in the director the fiduciary duties of finding the best value
reasonably possible for stockholders and making complete disclosures
of every important fact concerning the merger. Id. (citing Paramount
Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48-49 (Del. 1994);
Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962)).
The court based the need for the common law fiduciary duties of
candor and maximization of shareholder value on the following: (1)
the confidence and trust placed in directors during negotiations; (2) a
director's position to affect the finances of shareholders; and (3) the
conflict of interest between directors and shareholders during a cashout merger. Id. at 339, 983 A.2d at 421 (citing Bennett, 187 A.2d at
409).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected the lower court's
holding that section 2-405.1(a) supersedes all recognized common law
duties that came before the adoption of the statute in 1976. Id. at 34041, 983 A.2d at 421-22. The court also disagreed with the Board's
argument that section 2-405.1(f), a 1999 amendment to the statute,
demonstrated the Maryland Legislature's intent to reject Revlon's
reasoning. Shenker, 411 Md. at 340-41, 983 A.2d at 421-22. The
court found that the amendment did not reject the duties characterized
in Revlon because the basis for section 2-405.1 (f) and the basis for the
holding in Revlon rely on different circumstances. Id. at 340-41, 983
A.2d at 421-22. Section 2-405.1(f) sought to strengthen and protect a
director's defense mechanisms against hostile takeover attempts,
whereas the holding in Revlon involved circumstances where the sale
of the corporation was inevitable, and the only shareholder interest
remaining was to maximize the value of their shares. Id.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also rejected the argument that
the shareholders' action could only come in the form of a shareholder
derivative suit. Id. at 346, 983 A.2d at 425. The court stated that,
because the injury alleged by the shareholders was a breach of a duty
that the Board owed directly to them, rather than to the corporation,
the shareholders could bring a direct suit. Id. Additionally, the court
affirmed the holding of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland that
the shareholder's civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting complaints
should be dismissed. Id. at 352-54, 983 A.2d at 428-30.
With this holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has injected
new life into the common law. The court doubled the avenues of legal
relief available to corporate shareholders in the context of a cash-out
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corporate merger transaction where the board of directors has already
made the decision to sell the company. Attorneys for shareholders
may now directly pursue common law claims against board members,
in addition to statutory claims. Corporate shareholders are also not
forced to seek relief through a shareholder derivative suit when they
are directly harmed in a cash-out merger transaction. Practitioners
should take note of the applicability of this opinion, as the court left
open the possibility of expanding its holding outside of cash-out
mergers, indicating that common law fiduciary duties of directors to
shareholders can be triggered by other appropriate events.

